PASTEL DE AÑO NUEVO



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Encimera: Batir las claras hasta que tripliquen su volumen, luego agregar el azúcar y mezclar hasta que se convierta en un merengue brillante.

Frotar las yemas con el aceite formando una fina mayonesa, luego verter sobre las claras y mezclar ligeramente con una cuchara de madera.

Se agrega harina, cacao y levadura en polvo al final, incorporando todos los ingredientes, mezclando suavemente.

Preparamos una forma redonda que cubrimos con papel de horno y ponemos toda la composición de la tapa que metemos al horno durante 35 minutos al calor adecuado.

jarabe: Ponga el agua, el azúcar y la esencia de ron en una tetera, dejándola hervir.

crema blanca: Mezclar bien la nata montada hasta que endurezca, agregar la miel, la leche, luego la gelatina usada según las instrucciones. Al final agregamos la esencia de vainilla y mezclamos todo. Dejamos enfriar hasta que se incorpore el bizcocho.

Crema negra: Preparamos una cacerola que ponemos al baño maría. El chocolate ligeramente derretido junto con la nata montada y la mantequilla los ponemos en la cacerola y dejamos que el chocolate se derrita, revolviendo constantemente. Cuando llegue al punto de ebullición lo sacamos del fuego y espere a que se enfríe.

Vidriar: Mezclar todos los ingredientes al baño maría y dejar hervir un poco.

montaje:

Cogemos la parte superior del bizcocho y lo cortamos en 3. Hacemos almíbar el fondo, añadimos una parte de la nata blanca, luego una fina '' tira '' de nata negra y la dejamos enfriar un poco. Luego volvemos con otra capa de crema blanca y continuar con la siguiente parte de la encimera (la 2da), almíbar, poner, crema blanca y negra, y luego la última parte de la encimera y decorar con glaseado, crema y cerezas.

¡Un bizcocho muy alto y buuunnn al gusto!



Abuso sexual

El estatuto de limitaciones del estado actual de Nueva York en casos de abuso sexual está resumido por la Conferencia Nacional de Legislaturas Estatales de la siguiente manera:

“En Nueva York, no existe un estatuto de limitaciones extendido para el abuso sexual, sin embargo, si el abuso se trata como un agravio intencional, el SOL de Nueva York es de un año. NUEVA YORK. Práctica Civil. Ley § 215. Si la víctima presenta un reclamo contra una iglesia o escuela que administró al perpetrador, o cualquier acción que se base en negligencia, en lugar de conducta criminal, el SOL es de 3 años & # 8211 N.Y. Práctica Civil. Ley § 214. Nueva York adoptó un estatuto especial de limitaciones para las víctimas de delitos sexuales en 2006 & # 8211 N.Y. Práctica Civil. Ley §213-c. El estatuto establece que las acciones por daños y perjuicios civiles por delitos sexuales definidos, incluido el abuso sexual de un menor, pueden iniciarse dentro de los 5 años posteriores a los hechos que constituyen el delito sexual ".

Una ley propuesta, conocida como la "Ley de Reforma del Abuso Sexual Infantil", [A.01042 (Prestlow)] enmendaría la CPLR agregando una sección 213-d que extendería el SOL de 3 a 6 años el tiempo en que una acción en la que el demandante estaba discapacitado como resultado de la infancia / locura en el momento en que se produjo la acción. También agregaría un estatuto de reactivación de 2 años en cuanto a cualquier acción que haya sido previamente prohibida por el SOL. El 9 de enero de 2013 se remitió al Comité de Códigos. Es un proyecto de ley de una sola casa, sin un proyecto de ley del Senado comparable. Otro proyecto de ley, A.04008 (Gabyszak), con múltiples patrocinadores, propone la adición del artículo 214-f a la CPLR, que extendería el SOL a 15 años de la ley, comenzando después del actual período de peaje para la infancia o después de la informe del incidente, lo que ocurra primero. Este proyecto de ley ha sido presentado en sesiones legislativas desde 2003 hasta 2009. Fue introducido el 30 de enero de 2013 y se refirió a los Códigos.


Usos y abusos de la ley de daños en la era COVID-19

Estamos en un mundo feliz, como todos saben. Los abogados de agravio, tanto los abogados del lado demandante como los abogados defensores, predicen una avalancha de casos. Algunos de estos casos serán aplicaciones no controvertidas de la doctrina de daños a las nuevas circunstancias creadas por COVID-19. Otros casos traspasarán los límites de la ley de agravios, que exige como responsabilidad la tríada de irregularidades, causalidad y daños. Los juicios convencionales deben seguir sin duda su curso legal, pero los tribunales deben desalentar los juicios no convencionales o incluso prohibirlos por ley. Aquí hay un resumen breve (y, lo que es más importante, incompleto):

NUEVA YORK, NY - 14 DE ABRIL: Una tienda minorista permanece cerrada el 14 de abril de 2020 en el distrito de Brooklyn de New. [+] Ciudad de York. Más de 2,100 tiendas minoristas en todo el país han anunciado cierres completos este año. La ciudad de Nueva York sigue siendo el epicentro de la pandemia de coronavirus en Estados Unidos. (Foto de Robert Nickelsberg / Getty Images)

Trajes convencionales:

Tales demandas ya se han presentado contra operadores de cruceros, hogares de ancianos y lugares de entretenimiento. Algunas veces, pero no siempre, será fácil de establecer negligencia (por ejemplo, si COVID se hubiera anunciado públicamente si la mayoría de los demás en la misma industria habían tomado medidas preventivas que el acusado no había tomado, etc.). Algunas veces, pero no siempre, será fácil de establecer causalidad (por ejemplo, algunos de los infectados por el virus se encontraban en lugares muy cerrados, como residencias de ancianos o cruceros, y dado nuestro conocimiento sobre los períodos de incubación, es razonable inferir que contrajeron el coronavirus en ese lugar). Algunas veces, pero no siempre, será fácil de establecer daños y perjuicios (Es fácil si una persona previamente sana contrae el coronavirus y muere, no es tan fácil si el demandante nunca desarrolló síntomas, pero está demandando por "miedo al coronavirus").

Cuando hay poca evidencia de negligencia (por ejemplo, cuando una fábrica creó separación social y desinfeccionó el equipo después de que se anunció la pandemia), se debe otorgar un juicio sumario a los acusados. Incluso si hay negligencia en un caso dado, la causalidad puede ser difícil de probar: tal vez la bomba de gasolina debería haber sido saneada con más frecuencia, pero ¿cómo puede el Sr. Smith probar que probablemente contrajo coronavirus en esa bomba? Por el contrario, la causalidad puede ser fácil de probar (por ejemplo, los presos con coronavirus claramente contrajeron la enfermedad dentro de las cárceles), pero puede que no haya negligencia (si, por ejemplo, simplemente no fue posible operar la prisión de otra manera).

Este es el agravio intencional de agresión. De hecho, han sido raras las apariciones de tales baterías, pero han ocurrido. Las baterías son tanto agravios como delitos. Si la víctima se somete a pruebas rápidamente y da positivo por coronavirus, se puede inferir la causalidad.

La Corte Suprema cierra la escapatoria de la Cuarta Enmienda que dejó a los policías dieciséis armas sin orden judicial

Los mejores EE. UU. Visa de inmigración para inversores extranjeros que participan en empresas emergentes

Reseña del libro: "Brat: An" 80s Story ", muy agradable de Andrew McCarthy

Trajes no convencionales:

  • Mi negocio fue cerrado por el gobierno, o (prudentemente) por mí debido a la pandemia, y usted se negó a pagarme a pesar del seguro de interrupción del negocio que contraté con su empresa.

Si una póliza de seguro por interrupción del negocio no incluye ninguna exclusión para pandemias o estados de emergencia ordenados por el gobierno, esto se convierte en una demanda bastante convencional. El problema es que el seguro de interrupción del negocio generalmente excluye la cobertura para enfermedades transmisibles como el coronavirus y, a menudo, la excluye para los estados de emergencia del gobierno. [Esto se debe a que los daños masivos son difíciles de reasegurar. Es por razones similares que el seguro para propietarios de viviendas generalmente excluye los daños por inundaciones, que pueden afectar a todas las casas en un área determinada.] Actualmente se ejerce presión sobre los gobiernos federal y estatal para obligar a las aseguradoras a pagar las reclamaciones por interrupción del negocio independientemente del lenguaje de la póliza. La industria de los restaurantes, limitada a los servicios de comida para llevar y de entrega por las leyes estatales, puede perder $ 225 mil millones en ventas durante los próximos tres meses. ¿Quién debe pagar por esta pérdida, los dueños de negocios, el gobierno o las aseguradoras? Una coalición de chefs famosos (incluidos Wolfgang Puck, Daniel Boulud y Jean-Georges Vongerichten) ha creado el Grupo de Interrupción de Negocio. GRANDE aparentemente ha presionado al presidente Trump para que penalice a las aseguradoras, o quizás para subsidiarlas para que paguen a pesar de su contrato. En cualquier caso, los restauradores ya han presentado un número considerable de demandas.

Un proyecto de ley que se está redactando en Nueva Jersey podría poner a ciertas aseguradoras en peligro por pérdidas por interrupción del negocio debido al brote de COVID-19, independientemente de las exclusiones que puedan tener sus pólizas de seguro. Tal ley puede tener serias fallas constitucionales en virtud de la cláusula de Contratos, a menos que se aplique solo a los contratos celebrados después de la aprobación del proyecto de ley.

  • Tú o tus productos me rescataron mal. El consultorio de su médico, o su hospital, fue el lugar donde contraje el coronavirus. Alternativamente, la máscara o los guantes que fabricaste no me protegieron. Alternativamente, la vacuna anti-COVID-19 (una vez que se desarrolló) no funcionó para mí.

Los problemas legales con este tipo de demandas son numerosos. Estableciendo negligencia será difícil: ¿qué, en previsión (la retrospectiva es 20/20) hizo mal el médico o el hospital? ¿Cómo y a qué costo se podrían haber hecho "perfectos" la máscara o los guantes? Estableciendo causalidad También será difícil: ¿cómo sabemos que la víctima contrajo el coronavirus en el consultorio de ese médico, o cuando estaba usando la máscara supuestamente porosa? Las dificultades de tales demandas, combinadas con la desventaja de la "regla estadounidense" (que obliga a los acusados ​​que son demandados a pagar los honorarios de sus propios abogados, incluso si no se los considera responsables, y que, por lo tanto, lleva a los acusados ​​que no han hecho absolutamente nada incorrecto para resolver) es un muy buen argumento para la adopción de los estatutos de inmunidad COVID-19 a favor de los rescatistas y los fabricantes de vacunas. La responsabilidad debe limitarse a los casos (muy raros) en los que un defecto de fabricación causa daño (por ejemplo, si un lote de vacuna se contaminó con una sustancia extraña que produjo un daño "distintivo" en las personas que recibieron el lote contaminado).

Los médicos que recetan medicamentos, que la FDA ha aprobado para otros usos, a pacientes con COVID-19 deben estar protegidos de manera similar por la legislación de responsabilidad si esos medicamentos no funcionan, siempre que la literatura científica respalde su uso para este propósito. Las “prescripciones no autorizadas”, como se les llama, son tan comunes que prácticamente todos los medicamentos se utilizan de forma no autorizada en algunas circunstancias. Sería negligente no recetar hidroxicloroquina a pacientes con COVID-19 en muchos casos, por ejemplo.

El 27 de marzo, el presidente Trump promulgó la ley H.R. 748, la “Ley de ayuda, alivio y seguridad económica por el coronavirus” (Ley CARES). Esta ley incluye el lenguaje del llamado “buen samaritano” que brinda protección federal contra la responsabilidad de los profesionales de atención médica voluntarios durante la respuesta de emergencia COVID-19 (consulte la sección 3215). Esto, creo, es un avance positivo.

  • Estoy deprimido por el desempleo o mi fondo de jubilación ha disminuido debido al cierre del mercado de valores.

Estos casos preocupantes a menudo son daños sin irregularidades. Los gobiernos dictaron el cierre de muchas industrias, y creas o no que su elección de política fue correcta, seguramente fue razonable. De manera similar, los comerciantes seguramente tienen derecho a cerrar y despedir a los empleados si no obtienen ingresos suficientes después de la pandemia. La angustia económica se aborda mejor públicamente, como lo ha hecho la ley CARES para aquellos directamente perjudicados. El daño económico indirecto (la depresión reduce los ingresos de jubilación) generalmente no se compensa en el caso de agravio, y se ve mejor como un riesgo de invertir y de vivir. La angustia psicológica, aunque real, tampoco se compensa debido a la dificultad de separar los daños reales de los simulados. Este "riesgo moral" es la razón por la cual Common Law Torts no permite el agravio de la imposición negligente de angustia emocional. Donde no hay negligencia, hay menos razones para compensar.

Podría continuar, pero creo que he resumido los principales tipos de demandas que han sido y serán impulsadas por COVID-19. Sin embargo, no he discutido una demanda contra China: si ese país permitió negligentemente que el virus se propagara al exterior ocultándolo del resto del mundo, su perfidia es probablemente la causa de billones de dólares en daños reales. Como ha demostrado mi colega abogado Stephen Carter, la inmunidad soberana protege de responsabilidad a este masivo infractor (aunque ya se han presentado demandas quijotescas en los EE. UU. E Israel).


Agravios de menores

Agravios:
Un conjunto de derechos, obligaciones y recursos que aplican los tribunales en los procedimientos civiles para brindar reparación a las personas que han sufrido daños por los actos ilícitos de otros. La persona que sufre una lesión o un daño material como resultado de una conducta ilícita se conoce como demandante, y la persona que es responsable de infligir la lesión e incurre en responsabilidad por el daño se conoce como el demandado o el autor del daño.
En toda acción extracontractual deben establecerse tres elementos. Primero, el demandante debe establecer que el demandado tenía la obligación legal de actuar de una manera particular. En segundo lugar, el demandante debe demostrar que el demandado violó este deber al no conformar su comportamiento en consecuencia. En tercer lugar, el demandante debe probar que sufrió lesiones o pérdidas como resultado directo del incumplimiento del demandado.
La ley de agravios se deriva de una combinación de principios de common law y promulgaciones legislativas. A diferencia de las acciones por incumplimiento de contrato, las acciones de agravio no dependen de un acuerdo entre las partes de una demanda. A diferencia de los enjuiciamientos penales, que son iniciados por el gobierno, las acciones de agravio son iniciadas por ciudadanos privados. Los remedios por actos delictivos incluyen daños monetarios y mandatos judiciales (órdenes judiciales que obligan o prohíben una conducta particular). Los agraviantes no están sujetos a multa ni encarcelamiento en un tribunal civil.

Presunción refutable:
En el derecho probatorio, presunción que puede ser refutada o controvertida si se introducen pruebas contrarias. Posteriormente, la carga de la prueba se traslada a la otra parte.

Responsabilidad subsidiaria:
La imposición de responsabilidad extracontractual a una persona (que no es directamente responsable de la lesión), por la conducta de otra persona basada únicamente en la relación entre las dos personas.

Responsabilidad de los menores por sus propios agravios

Un menor es responsable de sus propios agravios. Sin embargo, el tribunal a menudo aplicará un estándar más indulgente. Para determinar la responsabilidad extracontractual de los niños, existen reglas especiales, generalmente basadas en la edad del menor. Históricamente, hubo una prueba de línea brillante basada en la edad del niño. Específicamente:

  • Menores de 7 años: Un niño no puede ser negligente.
  • Entre los 7 y los 14 años: Había una presunción refutable de que el niño no podía ser negligente.
  • Entre los 14 y los 21 años: Había una presunción refutable de que el niño era capaz de negligencia.

EJEMPLO: Ted tenía 6 años cuando se lesionó después de correr frente a un automóvil. El conductor argumentó que Ted fue contribuyente negligente como cuestión de ley. El tribunal de primera instancia sostuvo que el niño no podía ser negligente debido a su edad. Sin embargo, en la apelación, el tribunal dictaminó que el jurado debería poder decidir si, con base en los hechos y circunstancias de este caso y las características de este niño, se podría considerar que Ted fue negligente. Ver, por ejemplo, Tyler contra Weed, 280 N.W. 827 (Michigan, 1938). Ver también, Baker v. Alt, 132 N.W. 2d 614 (Michigan, 1965).

El uso de una prueba subjetiva ha reemplazado el antiguo uso de la prueba de edad cronológica. Esta prueba trata sobre la capacidad de un niño en particular para reconocer y evitar riesgos y daños. Los factores considerados en este análisis incluyen:

Dada la diferencia en las tasas de desarrollo infantil, esta prueba puede evaluar con mayor precisión la culpabilidad de un niño.

EJEMPLO: Albert (12 años) fue herido por una bala de un arma disparada por su primo, George (12 años), mientras jugaban en una cabaña propiedad de su abuelo común. En un intento por derrotar una acción de allanamiento interpuesta por Albert contra George y su abuelo, George confió en su edad para abstenerse de cualquier culpa por sus acciones. Si la prueba de la edad cronológica hubiera sido aplicable, se habría presumido que George no podía ser negligente. En cambio, el tribunal de apelaciones confirmó que el tribunal de primera instancia determinó que George y su abuelo eran responsables de las lesiones de Albert. El tribunal determinó que George estaba "bajo la obligación de ejercer un cuidado razonable, que se midió por el" cuidado razonable "que otros menores de edad, experiencia, capacidad y desarrollo similares normalmente ejercerían en circunstancias similares". EEE Kuhns contra Brugger, 135 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1957).

El estándar cambia cuando un menor se involucra en una actividad adulta, como conducir un automóvil o volar un avión. En estos casos, el niño debe cumplir los mismos estándares que un adulto.

EJEMPLO: David, que tenía 15 años, murió cuando una motocicleta que conducía chocó con el automóvil del conductor. En el juicio, el conductor se opuso a la norma de menores, que indicaba que debido a que el difunto era menor de 21 años en el momento del accidente, se lo consideraba un menor y no debía recibir el mismo grado de atención que un adulto. En cambio, se argumentó que se requería que el difunto ejerciera el cuidado del niño promedio de su edad, experiencia y etapa de desarrollo mental. Siguiendo esas instrucciones del jurado, el jurado emitió un veredicto a favor del administrador de la herencia de David. En la apelación, el tribunal sostuvo que el estándar correcto de atención era el de un adulto porque David (aunque era menor de edad) estaba conduciendo un vehículo motorizado. Ver, por ejemplo, Daniels contra Evans, 224 A.2d 63 (N.H. 1966). Como tal, al menos David posiblemente podría haber sido considerado negligente contribuyente en el accidente.

Responsabilidad parental por agravios de menores

Una encuesta de varios programas de televisión de jueces revelaría una buena cantidad de demandas contra menores. A menudo, el demandante intenta cobrar una restitución a los padres por la conducta ilícita de un menor. En determinadas circunstancias, los padres pueden ser considerados civil o penalmente negligentes por la conducta de sus hijos menores.

Cada estado tiene su propia ley con respecto a la responsabilidad financiera de los padres por los actos de sus hijos. Los padres son responsables de las acciones dañinas de sus hijos de la misma manera que los empleadores son responsables de las acciones dañinas de sus empleados. Este concepto legal se conoce como responsabilidad subsidiaria. El padre es responsable indirectamente, a pesar de no ser directamente responsable de la lesión. Varios estados responsabilizan económicamente a los padres por los daños causados ​​por sus hijos. Sin embargo, algunos de estos estados imponen límites al monto de la responsabilidad. Por ejemplo, en California, los padres son civilmente responsables de los "actos de mala conducta intencional de un menor que resulten en la muerte, lesiones personales o daños a la propiedad". Ver Cal. Civ. Código § 1714.1 (2005). Específicamente,

Ver Cal. Civ. Código § 1714.1 (a) (2005).

EJEMPLO: Andrew, que tiene 16 años, se dio una borrachera con algunos amigos (también menores de edad). Mientras estaba borracho, robó un pequeño avión y se fue de paseo con sus amigos. No tenía licencia de piloto. Aunque logró aterrizar el avión sin incidentes, se deslizó en otro avión pequeño y causó daños por valor de $ 10,000. El propietario del avión averiado demandó a Andrew y a sus padres. Si este incidente hubiera ocurrido en California, tanto Andrew como sus padres podrían ser considerados responsables conjunta y solidariamente por los $ 10,000 en daños como resultado de la mala conducta intencional de Andrew. Ver Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.1 ver también Nev. Rvdo. Estado. Ana. § 41.470 (2005).

Otros tipos de responsabilidad extracontractual están cubiertos más completamente en la clase de agravios.

Responsabilidad por crímenes

En el derecho consuetudinario, también había demarcaciones específicas por edad con respecto a la responsabilidad de los menores por conducta delictiva:

  • Menores de 7 años: Se consideró concluyentemente que un niño era incapaz de cometer un delito.
  • Entre los 7 y los 14 años: Había una presunción de que el niño no podía formar una intención criminal, sin embargo, esta presunción podría ser refutada por el estado demostrando que el niño tenía suficiente inteligencia para formar una intención criminal.
  • Entre los 14 y los 21 años: Se consideró que un menor tenía la misma capacidad para formar un intento delictivo que un adulto.

Hoy en día, la mayoría de los estados se ocupan de los delincuentes juveniles con estatutos que se centran en la supervisión y rehabilitación del menor en un proceso civil. Generalmente, los menores permanecen bajo la jurisdicción de los tribunales de menores hasta la edad de 16 o 18 años, después de lo cual quedan sujetos a las mismas responsabilidades penales que los adultos. Sin embargo, a medida que los perpetradores más jóvenes cometen delitos violentos, el sistema de justicia penal lucha por saber cómo manejar estas situaciones.


¿De qué raza es mi agravio?

hola, hemos tenido a nuestra Reggie por más de 3 años, la conseguimos de un amigo de la familia que se estaba mudando. La teníamos en un recinto, pero seguía rascando y siempre se atascaba tratando de abrirla. Actualmente vive en el piso de mi habitación, esto es muy controvertido, lo he visto, pero no ha tenido problemas para morder muebles, ser pateada o comer cosas que no debe hacer. ¡Algunos de los recintos publicados aquí son increíbles! -Pero me siento mal por tenerla en un espacio pequeño.

¿Puedes darme una idea del mundo de las tortugas e identificar qué tipo de tortuga es? ¡No he visto una como ella! Además, ¿puede darme algún consejo sobre cómo cuidarla y asegurarse de que viva su vida al máximo? Gracias

Miembro conocido

Almohadakale222

Nuevo miembro


lo siento si la he abrazado de la manera incorrecta- no he revisado el plastrón antes- definitivamente necesita un baño

Hoja de cuidado de la tortuga del desierto

La hoja de cuidados que @Tom vinculó para usted en el otro hilo es la hoja de cuidados más actualizada y precisa para las tortugas del desierto.

El entrenador de perros

Para las personas que están más tierra adentro, en áreas más cálidas y secas, se puede hacer satisfactoriamente sin calor, pero incluso para ellos, es mejor con calor.

Si se comunica con las personas de las que obtuvo la tortuga, o con la mayoría de las personas que tienen y mantienen adultos, le dirán que estará bien sin calefacción. Con toda probabilidad, la tortuga terminará con un RI y eventualmente morirá tan cerca de la costa. Solía ​​trabajar en la playa Hermosa en una tienda de mascotas y rescatamos a varios DT enfermos cada año. La cura fue trasladarlos tierra adentro a Whittier en la casa de un amigo.

RobinRae

Nuevo miembro

Para las personas que están más tierra adentro, en áreas más cálidas y secas, se puede hacer satisfactoriamente sin calor, pero incluso para ellos, es mejor con calor.

Si se comunica con las personas de las que obtuvo la tortuga, o con la mayoría de las personas que tienen y mantienen adultos, le dirán que estará bien sin calefacción. Con toda probabilidad, la tortuga terminará con un RI y eventualmente morirá tan cerca de la costa. Solía ​​trabajar en la playa Hermosa en una tienda de mascotas y rescatamos a varios DT enfermos cada año. La cura fue trasladarlos tierra adentro a Whittier en la casa de un amigo.


Agravio limitado vs. Agravio total y # 8211 Excepciones a agravio limitado en PA

En Pensilvania, las compañías de seguros ofrecen pastel cobertura, que otorga a las personas cubiertas el derecho a demandar en los tribunales por daños y perjuicios totales, y agravio limitado cobertura que restringe la capacidad de demandar por dolor y sufrimiento.

Incluso si una persona resulta lesionada en un accidente automovilístico por daños limitados en su póliza de seguro de automóvil de Pensilvania, existen excepciones a los daños limitados que aún permiten que la parte lesionada demande por dolor y sufrimiento.

Bajo la Ley de Responsabilidad de Vehículos Motorizados de Pensilvania, hay excepciones en las que una parte lesionada que eligió un agravio limitado o está asegurada por una póliza de agravio limitada aún puede recuperar un acuerdo de dolor y sufrimiento como si tuviera una póliza de agravio completa. Estas excepciones se pueden encontrar bajo la ley en 75 Pa. Contras. Estado. § 1705 (d), e incluye lo siguiente:

  1. Conductor borracho causó el accidenteEl agravio limitado no se aplica si el conductor culpable del accidente es condenado por conducir bajo la influencia (DUI) (DWI) o acepta Disposición de rehabilitación acelerada o (Programa ARD). La clave para recordar es que la persona debe ser condenada por DUI o aceptar ARD (a menudo llamado "programa para delincuentes por primera vez").
  2. Un conductor sin seguro causó el accidente. Según la ley de Pensilvania, si el conductor que causó el accidente no estaba asegurado, la parte lesionada no está sujeta a responsabilidad civil limitada. La ley dice que el agravio limitado no se aplica "siempre que la persona culpable no haya mantenido la responsabilidad financiera como lo exige" la ley de Pensilvania. 75 Pa. Contras. Estado. Sección 1705 (d) (1) (iv). Esto significa que si la víctima lesionada en un accidente automovilístico tiene cobertura de automovilista sin seguro o seguro de UM, se puede hacer un reclamo contra su propia compañía de seguros y usted no estará sujeto a la opción de responsabilidad civil limitada, incluso si eligió la responsabilidad civil limitada en su propio automóvil. política.
  3. Coche matriculado en otro estado. Si la persona que causó el accidente conducía un vehículo registrado en un estado fuera de Pensilvania, no se aplica el agravio limitado. Como muchos accidentes automovilísticos en el área de Filadelfia a menudo son causados ​​por conductores con un automóvil registrado en Nueva Jersey, Nueva York, Maryland o Delaware, esta es una excepción significativa. Recuerde, no es desde donde está el conductor lo que controla, sino desde donde está registrado el automóvil. 75 Pa. Contras. Estado. Sección 1705 (d) (1) (i).
  4. Pasajero en unVehículo comercial o motocicleta. Si la parte lesionada era un pasajero en un taxi, autobús, Uber, Lyft, vehículo de alquiler, motocicleta o cualquier otro tipo de vehículo que no sea un "vehículo privado de pasajeros", la parte lesionada tiene derecho a una cobertura total de responsabilidad civil incluso si así lo eligió. agravio limitado en su propia política. Un vehículo de pasajeros privado no incluye un vehículo que se alquila a otros (camión de alquiler o automóvil de alquiler), utilizado por el público (como Uber, Lyft o un taxi), o que se utiliza principalmente con fines comerciales (camión de remolque, autobús, furgoneta pública). 75 Pa. Contras. Estado. Sección 1705 (d) (3). Un vehículo privado de pasajeros se define como el que tiene cuatro ruedas, lo que permite a los motociclistas / pasajeros obtener la excepción al agravio limitado.
  5. Ciclista o peatón. Un peatón o ciclista lesionado por un automóvil no está sujeto a un agravio limitado, a pesar de lo que eligió para su propia póliza de automóvil. Por lo tanto, si usted o un ser querido estaba cruzando la calle o andando en bicicleta y fue atropellado por un automóvil, no importa que haya elegido responsabilidad civil limitada en su propia política de automóvil.
  6. La lesión implicó una "lesión grave" según la ley. La ley establece que "a menos que la lesión sufrida sea una lesión grave, toda persona que esté obligada por la elección de responsabilidad extracontractual limitada no podrá mantener una acción por cualquier pérdida no económica [dolor y sufrimiento]". Entonces, ¿qué significa una lesión grave? La Legislatura de Pensilvania ha definido una lesión grave como "una lesión que ocasiona la muerte, un deterioro grave de una función corporal o una desfiguración permanente". 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. Sin embargo, los tribunales de Pensilvania han sostenido que todas las lesiones son diferentes y que incluso una lesión de tejido blando puede constituir una “lesión grave” cuando está claramente documentada y afecta sustancialmente la función corporal.

Para determinar si un impedimento reclamado es "grave", el Tribunal debe considerar los siguientes factores: (1) el alcance del impedimento (2) la función corporal particular que se vio afectada (3) el tiempo que duró el impedimento (4) el tipo de tratamiento requerido para corregir el deterioro y (5) cualquier otro factor relevante. Los tribunales de Pensilvania han sostenido que la atención no se centra solo en el tipo de lesión, sino más bien en cómo las lesiones afectaron una función corporal en particular. Normalmente, se necesitará un testimonio médico para probar una lesión grave.

Algunos ejemplos de casos en los que los tribunales sostuvieron que la lesión podría ser "grave" y el jurado debía determinar si la lesión era grave incluyen:

  • La demandante continuó experimentando dolor en el cuello, la espalda, las piernas, junto con dolores de cabeza, no podía sentarse ni pararse durante períodos prolongados y se perdía las actividades de sus hijos. Cadena contra Latch, 78 A.3d 636 (Pa. Super. 2013)
  • El demandante sufrió una hernia de disco y se sometió a un curso de fisioterapia y se vio afectado en su capacidad para dormir, correr y caminar largas distancias, jugar con su hijo, andar en bicicleta de montaña y motocicleta, aunque solo faltó 3 días al trabajo. Kelly contra Ziolko, 734 A.2d 893 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)
  • La demandante sufrió un disco abultado, dolor que se irradiaba hacia su pierna, tuvo dificultad para levantar objetos pesados ​​y jugar con su hija, y continuó experimentando dolor durante más de un año. Furman contra Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Super. 1998).
  • El demandante sufría síndrome de dolor crónico, no podía realizar muchas actividades físicas, incluidas las tareas del hogar y la recreación, sin dolor y tenía dificultad para dormir.Robinson contra Upole750 A.2d 339 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Un bufete de abogados con experiencia en accidentes automovilísticos como The Pearce Law Firm sabe cómo demostrar que su lesión fue "grave" para cumplir con el umbral para superar un agravio limitado. Nos aseguraremos de que se someta a pruebas de diagnóstico, como una resonancia magnética o una radiografía, para ver si hay una fractura o una hernia de disco.

Además, si sufrió cicatrices, lo documentaremos con su médico. Además, le pediremos que lleve un diario de cómo sus lesiones han afectado su vida, como no permitirle jugar con su hijo o participar en actividades sociales. Si tiene dolor y síntomas, será importante que continúe entregando este documento a la compañía de seguros. También le mostraremos a la compañía de seguros cómo la lesión ha afectado su trabajo, ya sea demostrando que ha perdido un tiempo considerable del trabajo o que tiene restricciones y no puede realizar su trabajo al máximo como solía hacerlo.

  1. Otras excepciones al agravio limitado. Otras excepciones menos comunes que se utilizan para superar los daños limitados incluyen los accidentes causados ​​por un defecto en el diseño, fabricación, reparación o mantenimiento de un vehículo. Por último, existe una excepción si la persona que causó el accidente tuvo la intención de lesionarse a sí mismo oa otra persona.

El bufete de abogados Pearce está aquí para ayudarlo. Tener un abogado de responsabilidad civil limitada con experiencia es importante para evaluar su caso. Edith Pearce trabajó durante años como abogada para una compañía de seguros de automóviles. Ella sabe cómo superar la defensa de responsabilidad civil limitada si los hechos de su caso cumplen con una de las excepciones. Ella revisará a fondo su caso de accidente automovilístico y la documentación de su seguro. Llame a nuestra firma. Ofrecemos consultas gratuitas, así que no arriesgue su caso con cualquiera.

Vea lo que Kaitlin dijo sobre nosotros en Google:

Recomendaría este bufete de abogados a cualquiera. Edith, William y Nicole hacen todo lo posible por sus clientes y les ayudan a recibir la justicia que merecen. ¡Estarás en buenas manos con esta firma!


Cinco reglas clave del IRS sobre cómo se gravan los acuerdos de demanda

Muchos demandantes ganan o resuelven una demanda y se sorprenden de tener que pagar impuestos. Algunos no se dan cuenta hasta la época de impuestos del año siguiente, cuando los Formularios 1099 del IRS llegan por correo. Un poco de planificación fiscal, especialmente antes de llegar a un acuerdo, es muy útil. Es aún más importante ahora con impuestos más altos sobre los acuerdos de demandas bajo la ley de reforma tributaria recientemente aprobada. Muchos demandantes también pagan impuestos sobre los honorarios de sus abogados, incluso si su abogado toma el 40% de la parte superior. In a $100,000 case, that means paying tax on $100,000, even if $40,000 goes to the lawyer. The new law generally does not impact physical injury cases with no punitive damages. It also should not impact plaintiffs suing their employers, although there are new wrinkles in sexual harassment cases. Here are five rules to know.

1. Taxes depend on the “origin of the claim.” Taxes are based on the origin of your claim. If you get laid off at work and sue seeking wages, you’ll be taxed as wages, and probably some pay on a Form 1099 for emotional distress. But if you sue for damage to your condo by a negligent building contractor, your damages may not be income. You may be able to treat the recovery as a reduction in your purchase price of the condo. The rules are full of exceptions and nuances, so be careful, how settlement awards are taxed, especially post-tax reform.

2. Recoveries for physical injuries and physical sickness are tax-free, but symptoms of emotional distress are not physical. If you sue for physical injuries, damages are tax-free. Before 1996, all “personal” damages were tax-free, so emotional distress and defamation produced tax-free recoveries. But since 1996, your injury must be “physical.” If you sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress, your recovery is taxed. Physical symptoms of emotional distress (like headaches and stomachaches) is taxed, but physical injuries or sickness is not. The rules can make some tax cases chicken or egg, with many judgment calls. If in an employment dispute you receive $50,000 extra because your employer gave you an ulcer, is an ulcer physical, or merely a symptom of emotional distress? Many plaintiffs take aggressive positions on their tax returns, but that can be a losing battle if the defendant issues an IRS Form 1099 for the entire settlement. Haggling over tax details before you sign and settle is best.

3. Allocating damages can save taxes . Most legal disputes involve multiple issues. You might claim that the defendant kept your laptop, frittered away your trust fund, underpaid you, failed to reimburse you for a business trip, or other items. Even if your dispute relates to one course of conduct, there’s a good chance the total settlement involves several types of consideration. It is best for plaintiff and defendant to agree on tax treatment. Such agreements aren’t binding on the IRS or the courts in later tax disputes, but they are usually not ignored by the IRS.

4. Attorney fees are a tax trap. If you are the plaintiff and use a contingent fee lawyer, you’ll usually be treated (for tax purposes) as receiving 100% of the money recovered by you and your attorney, even if the defendant pays your lawyer directly his contingent fee cut. If your case is fully nontaxable (say an auto accident in which you’re injured), that shouldn't cause any tax problems. But if your recovery is taxable, watch out. Say you settle a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress against your neighbor for $100,000, and your lawyer keeps $40,000. You might think you’d have $60,000 of income. Instead, you’ll have $100,000 of income. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Commissioner v. Banks, that plaintiffs generally have income equal to 100% of their recoveries. even if their lawyers take a share.

How about deducting the legal fees? In 2004, Congress enacted an above the line deduction for legal fees in employment claims and certain whistleblower claims. That deduction still remains, but outside these two areas, there's big trouble. in the big tax bill passed at the end of 2017, there's a new tax on litigation settlements, no deduction for legal fees. No tax deduction for legal fees comes as a bizarre and unpleasant surprise. Tax advice early, before the case settles and the settlement agreement is signed, is essential.

5. Punitive damages and interest are always taxable. If you are injured in a car crash and get $50,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages, the former is tax-free. The $5 million is fully taxable, and you can have trouble deducting your attorney fees! The same occurs with interest. You might receive a tax-free settlement or judgment, but pre-judgment or post-judgment interest is always taxable (and can produce attorney fee problems). That can make it attractive to settle your case rather than have it go to judgment. For a crazy example how these tax rules can whittle after-tax amounts to nothing, check out how IRS taxes kill plaintiff's $289M Monsanto weedkiller verdict.


Contents

At the time of the 1928 New York Court of Appeals decision in Palsgraf, that state's case law followed a classical formation for negligence: the plaintiff had to show that the Long Island Railroad [a] ("LIRR" or "the railroad") had a duty of care, and that she was injured through a breach of that duty. It was not required that she show that the duty owed was to her. [1] Under New York precedent, the usual duty of utmost care that the railroad as a common carrier owed its customers did not apply to platforms and other parts of the station. [1]

Facts Edit

Sunday, August 24, 1924, was a warm summer day in Brooklyn, and Helen Palsgraf, a 40-year-old janitor and housekeeper, was taking her two daughters, Elizabeth and Lillian, aged 15 and 12, to Rockaway Beach. Having paid the necessary fare, they were on the platform at the East New York station of the LIRR on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn, when a train, not theirs, pulled in. As it began to move again, two men raced for the train, and one made it without incident, as the doors had not closed. The other, a man carrying a package, leapt aboard, with the help of a platform guard pushing him from behind as a member of the train's crew pulled him into the car. But in the process, the man lost the package, which dropped and exploded, for it apparently contained fireworks. Either the force of the explosion or the panicking of those on the platform caused a tall, coin-operated scale to topple onto Helen Palsgraf. No one was hurt enough to spend the night in the hospital, though several people, Palsgraf among them, were listed as injured. [2] [3]

Contemporary accounts and witnesses at trial described the man as Italian in appearance, and there was speculation that the package was being taken for use at an Italian-American celebration of some sort no great effort was made to identify the owner. Palsgraf's injury was listed in The New York Times as shock she also suffered bruising. The distance between Helen Palsgraf and the explosion was never made clear in the trial transcript, or in the opinions of the judges who ruled on the case, but the distance from the explosion to the scale was described in the Times as "more than ten feet away" (3 metres). [2] [3] Several days after the incident, she developed a bad stammer, and her doctor testified at trial that it was due to the trauma of the events at East New York station. She had not recovered from the stammer when the case came to court. [4]

Trial Edit

Palsgraf brought suit against the railroad in the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, a trial-level court, in Brooklyn on October 2, 1924. The summons was served the following month, and the defendant filed its answer on December 3. The case was heard on May 24 and 25, 1927, with Justice Burt Jay Humphrey presiding. [5] Humphrey had served for over twenty years on the county court in Queens before unexpectedly being nominated for election to the Supreme Court in 1925 he was noted for his courteous and friendly manner. [6] Manhattan lawyers tried the Brooklyn case: Matthew W. Wood, who worked from 233 Broadway (the Woolworth Building) represented Palsgraf, while Joseph F. Keany, whose office was at Pennsylvania Station, was for the railroad, along with William McNamara. [5] Wood was an experienced solo practitioner with two degrees from Ivy League schools Keany had headed the LIRR's legal department for twenty years—McNamara, who tried the case, was one of the department's junior lawyers, who had advanced from clerk to counsel after graduation from law school. [7] At trial, Palsgraf testified that she had been hit in the side by the scale, and had been treated at the scene, and then took a taxicab home. She testified to trembling then for several days, and then the stammering started. Her health forced her to give up her work in mid-1926. [8] Wood called Herbert Gerhardt, an engraver, who had seen the man with the package hurry towards the train, and whose wife had been hit in the stomach in the man's rush. He testified that the scale had been "blown right to pieces". [9]

On the second day of the trial, Wood called Dr. Karl A. Parshall, Palsgraf's physician. He testified that he had treated Palsgraf occasionally for minor ailments before the incident at East New York, but on the day after found her shaken and bruised. He gave it as his opinion that Palsgraf's ills were caused by the accident. [10] Grace Gerhardt, Herbert's wife, was the next witness. She testified to being hit by one of "the two young Italian fellows" who were racing to make the train, and how one made it unaided and the other only with the help of two LIRR employees. She had nothing to say about the scale or Palsgraf, having seen neither. [11] Elizabeth and Lillian Palsgraf, the elder and younger daughter of the plaintiff, were next to testify and spoke of what they had seen. Wood indicated his only remaining witness was a neurologist, an expert witness, and McNamara for the LIRR moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Palsgraf had failed to present evidence of negligence, but Justice Humphrey denied it. The neurologist, Graeme M. Hammond of Manhattan, had examined Palsgraf two days before, observing her stammering, speaking only with difficulty. She told him of depression and headaches. He diagnosed her with traumatic hysteria, for which the explosion was a plausible cause, and said the hysteria was likely to continue as long as the litigation did, for only once it was resolved were the worries connected with it likely to vanish. [12]

Wood rested his case on behalf of the plaintiff McNamara offered no evidence but again moved to dismiss, which Humphrey denied. The judge told the all-male jury that if the LIRR employees "omitted to do the things which prudent and careful trainmen do for the safety of those who are boarding their trains, as well as the safety of those who are standing upon the platform waiting for other trains, and that the failure resulted in the plaintiff's injury, then the defendant would be liable." [13] The jury was out for two hours and 35 minutes, including the lunch hour, and they awarded Palsgraf $6,000 ($89,400 today). [14] Pursuant to statute, she also recovered costs of $142, an amount added to the verdict. [15] A motion for a new trial was denied on May 27, 1927 by Justice Humphrey, who did not issue a written opinion, and a judgment was entered on the verdict on May 31, from which the LIRR appealed on June 14. [16] Once Palsgraf had gotten her jury verdict, the Gerhardts also sued the railroad, with Wood as their counsel. [17]

William H. Manz, in his article on the facts in Palsgraf, suggested that neither side spent much time preparing for trial. Wood did not contact his fact witnesses, the Gerhardts, until shortly before the trial, and Palsgraf was examined by Dr. Hammond the day before the trial started. McNamara, one of the most junior members of the LIRR's legal team, called no witnesses, and Manz suggested the entire defense strategy was to get the judge to dismiss the case. [18] In his later book, Judge Richard Posner indicated that the much-sued LIRR did not present a better case than the first-time plaintiff: "it put on a bargain-basement defense".

Initial appeal Edit

The LIRR's appeal took the case to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, for the Second Department, [19] the state's intermediate appeals court. In its briefs before the Appellate Division, the LIRR argued that the verdict had been contrary to the law and the evidence. It stressed that it had no foreknowledge that the package was dangerous, and that no law required it to search the contents of passenger luggage. The brief stated that given this, there was no negligence in helping a man make a train, and even if there was, that negligence was not the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries. [20] Wood, for Palsgraf, argued that the jury verdict finding negligence was supported by undisputed facts, and should not be questioned by the appellate courts. The plaintiff's brief also suggested that the failure of the railroad to call as witnesses the employees who had aided the man should decide any inferences of negligence against it. Wood deemed the trainmen guilty of a "dereliction of duty", misconduct that was the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries. [21]

The lawyers argued the case before the Appellate Division in Brooklyn on October 21, 1927. [15] On December 9, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment, 3–2. Albert H. F. Seeger wrote the majority opinion for the five justices hearing the case, and was joined by Justices William F. Hagarty and William B. Carswell. [19] Seeger had been born in Stuttgart and came to the United States as a child he had been elected to the Supreme Court in 1917 and was elevated to the Appellate Division by Governor Al Smith in 1926. Aged 68 at the time of Palsgraf, he could serve only two more years before mandatory retirement. [22] Justice Seeger ruled that the finding of negligence by the jury was supported by the evidence, and speculated that the jury might have found that helping a passenger board a moving train was a negligent act. He wrote that while the set of facts might be novel, the case was no different in principle from well-known court decisions on causation, such as the Squib case, in which an explosive (a squib) was lit and thrown, then was hurled away repeatedly by people not wanting to be hurt until it exploded near the plaintiff, injuring him his suit against the man who had set the squib in motion was upheld. The majority also focused on the high degree of duty of care that the LIRR owed to Palsgraf, one of its customers. [23]

Presiding Justice Edward Lazansky (joined by Justice J. Addison Young) wrote a dissent. [19] Lazansky, the son of Czech immigrants, had been elected New York Secretary of State as a Democrat in 1910. Elected to the Supreme Court in 1917, he had been designated presiding justice of the Second Department by Governor Smith earlier in 1927. [22] Lazansky did not question the jury finding of negligence, but felt that the employees' conduct was not the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries, since the man's conduct in bringing a package that might explode to a crowded passenger station was an independent act of negligence, rendering the neglect by the railroad too remote in causation for there to be liability. [24]

The LIRR was entitled by law to take the case to the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) as there had been a dissent in the Appellate Division, and it did. [25] The railroad argued again that Palsgraf had failed to establish that she had come to harm through the railroad's negligence: that there was no negligence, and even if there was, that neglect had not harmed Palsgraf, since such injury was not "a natural and probable consequence of assisting a man to board a train". [20] Its brief alleged that the trainmen could not have stopped the man from boarding, and once he had flung himself onto the train, had little choice but to help him, "faced with such an emergency they cannot be charged with negligence because they elected to assist the man rather than stand idly by and leave him to his fate." [26] Wood, for his part, argued that negligence had been found by the jury, and by both majority and dissenting justices in the Appellate Division. He wrote that there were many facts from which the jury could have found negligence, including the fact that the train had not shut its doors as it departed (though whether this was to allow latecomers to board or because it was a summer day is uncertain). [27] The case was argued before the Court of Appeals in Albany on February 24, 1928. [28]

Cardozo's majority opinion Edit

Cardozo's statement of facts, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. at 340–341

The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Benjamin N. Cardozo, was a judge who was greatly respected he later became a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. After a standout legal career, Cardozo had been elected to the trial-level Supreme Court in 1913, but was quickly designated by the governor for service on the Court of Appeals. He was in 1917 appointed a judge of that court, and in 1926 was elected chief judge by the voters. [29] In Palsgraf, Cardozo wrote for a 4–3 majority of the Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate judgment and directing that the case be decided for the defendant, the LIRR. [30] Cardozo was joined by Judges Cuthbert W. Pound, Irving Lehman and Henry Kellogg. [31]

Despite being the longest statement of the facts in any of the four appellate opinions generated by the case, [32] Cardozo's was described by Posner as "elliptical and slanted". [33] It has also been deemed "highly abstract". [32] According to Professor Walter O. Weyrauch in his 1978 journal article, "Cardozo's famous opinion reduced the complicated facts of the case to a bare minimum. Mrs. Palsgraf was transformed into a 'plaintiff' without age, family status, or occupation. The opinion omitted the nature of her injury, the amount of damages that she sought, and the size of the jury award." [34] For example, Cardozo describes Palsgraf (whom he does not name, nor mention her daughters) as standing on the LIRR's platform, rather than waiting for a train, thus downplaying her status as a customer entitled to a high degree of care by the railroad. The explosive package is described as small, though the witnesses had described it as large. The scales are described as being "at the other end of the platform, many feet away" from the explosion, but the record does not support this statement. [35] This characterization may have been based on testimony by Lillian Palsgraf, who had gone to buy a paper from a newsstand "at the other end of the platform", but who was yet close enough to see the package fall. Cardozo's characterization of distance would be challenged by the plaintiff in her motion for reargument, which would be denied with the rejoinder that however close she was to the explosion, she was not so close as to bring her within the zone of foreseeable risk. [36]

After the fact pattern, Cardozo began his discussion of the law with "the conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relative to her it was not negligence at all." [37] Cardozo quoted Pollock on Torts and cited several cases for the proposition that "proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do." [37] Only if there is a duty to the injured plaintiff, the breach of which causes injury, can there be liability. [38] He defended his decision, "a different conclusion will involve us, and swiftly too, in a maze of contradictions." [37] Cardozo posed hypothetical situations: if a railway guard stumbles over a bundle of newspapers, and there are explosives within, will there be liability to an injured passenger at the other end of the platform? Will the result be different if the object containing the explosives is a valise instead? If there was negligence that day, Cardozo argued, it was only negligence that resulted in the fall and destruction of the package, and there was no wrong done by the railroad to Palsgraf for personal injury, "the diversity of incidents emphasizes the futility of the effort to build the plaintiff's right upon the basis of a wrong to some one else." [39] The chief judge instructed, "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed". [40] Cardozo did not absolve the defendant who knowingly unleashes a destructive force, such as by shooting a gun, just because the bullet takes an unexpected path. This is not such a case, Cardozo held: even if the railway guard had thrown down the package intentionally, without knowing the contents he could not knowingly risk harm to Palsgraf, and would not be liable. Negligence cannot impose liability where an intentional act would not. [41]

Negligence, Cardozo emphasized, derives from human relations, not in the abstract. Negligence that does no one harm is not a tort. It is not enough, he found, to prove negligence by the defendant and damage to the plaintiff there must be a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. He traced the history of the law of negligence, a concept not known in medieval times, and noted that it evolved as an offshoot of the law of trespass, and one could not sue for trespass to another. Had the railroad been negligent towards Palsgraf, it might have been liable, but "the consequences to be followed must first be rooted in a wrong", and there was no legal wrong done by the railroad to Palsgraf. [42] Thus, the lower courts were incorrect, and must be reversed, and the case dismissed, with Palsgraf to bear the costs of suit. [43]

Dissent by Andrews Edit

William S. Andrews of Syracuse was a 69-year-old [44] judge, noted for his scholarship, who had been on the Court of Appeals since 1917. The son of Charles Andrews, a former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, William Andrews is best remembered today because he wrote an opinion in Palsgraf. [45] In that dissent, he was joined by Judges Frederick E. Crane and John F. O'Brien. Andrews began with a brief recitation of facts: that a railroad employee had negligently dislodged the package, the contents of which the trainman was unaware, and the subsequent explosion broke the scale and injured the plaintiff, "an intending passenger". [46] Andrews noted the fundamental difference among the judges concerning the law of negligence: whether there must be a duty to the plaintiff, the breach of which injured her, and whether, when there is an act that is a threat to the safety of others, the doer of it should be "liable for all its proximate consequences, even where they result in injury to one who would generally be thought to be outside the radius of danger". [46] Andrews believed that if there was a negligent act, the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, that should establish liability. [47]

Andrews found Cardozo's reasoning too narrow, and felt that the focus should be on the unreasonable act: driving down Broadway at high speed is negligent whether or not an accident occurs. Such an act is wrong to the public at large, not only to those who might be injured. "Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B or C alone . In an empty world, negligence would not exist. It does involve a relationship between man and his fellows. But not merely a relationship between man and those whom he might reasonably expect his act would injure. Rather, a relationship between him and those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a tendency to harm some one, it harms him a mile away as surely as it does those on the scene." [48]

Andrews pointed out that the law allows plaintiffs to recover from defendants who had no duty towards them: orphans may recover for their negligently killed parents a bereaved person may recover for negligence in the death of a spouse. An insurance company may sue in subrogation and recover the sum paid out from the person who started the fire. "Behind the cloud of words is the fact they hide, that the act, wrongful as to the insured, has also harmed the company." [49]

An event may have many causes, Andrews noted, and only some may be deemed proximate. Liability for negligence may only be found where that proximate cause exists, a term that the judge admitted was inexact. He suggested the analogy of a river, made up of water from many sources, and by the time it wound to sea, fully intermixed. But for a time, after water from a muddy swamp or a clayey bed joins, its origin may be traced. Beyond a certain point, it cannot be traced, and such is proximate cause, "because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics." [50]

That point, beyond which there is no proximate cause, is drawn differently by different judges, and by different courts, Andrews explained. He listed factors that courts might consider, such as remoteness in time or space, and discussed some hypotheticals, such as a chauffeur who causes an accident, the noise of which startles a nursemaid into dropping a child, then returned to the case being decided,

Mrs. Palsgraf was standing some distance away. How far cannot be told from the record—apparently twenty-five or thirty feet. Perhaps less. Except for the explosion, she would not have been injured. We are told by the appellant in his brief "it cannot be denied that the explosion was the direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries." So it was a substantial factor in producing the result—there was here a natural and continuous sequence—direct connection. The only intervening cause was that instead of blowing her to the ground the concussion smashed the weighing machine which in turn fell upon her. There was no remoteness in time, little in space. And surely, given such an explosion as here it needed no great foresight to predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no greater distance from its scene than was the plaintiff. Just how no one might be able to predict. Whether by flying fragments, by broken glass, by wreckage of machines or structures no one could say. But injury in some form was most probable. [51]

Given that, Andrews concluded, the jury verdict should be upheld. "Under these circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff's injuries were not the proximate result of the negligence. That is all we have before us." [51]

Wood, Palsgraf's lawyer, moved the Court of Appeals to allow reargument of the case, alleging that Cardozo had confused the position of Palsgraf with that of her daughter Lillian (at the newsstand), and complained about the chief judge's use of such terms as "distant" and "far away". Wood warned that the decision could have far-reaching adverse effects on innocent passengers. [52] The court denied the motion with a one-sentence statement likely written by Cardozo, "If we assume that the plaintiff was nearer the scene of the explosion than the prevailing opinion would suggest, she was not so near that injury from a falling package, not known to contain explosives, would be within the range of reasonable prevision." [36] Costs of $559.60 were due from Palsgraf to the railroad under Cardozo's order. [53] Posner doubted the sum was ever collected, noting that Palsgraf's family spoke to legal scholars and periodicals about the case in later years, and never mentioned an attempt to collect what would have been about a year's salary for the disabled former janitor. [54]

Helen Palsgraf remained embittered about the loss of her case. She became mute, and suffered from other health problems prior to her death on October 27, 1945, at the age of 61. At the time of her death, Palsgraf was living in Richmond Hill, Queens with her daughter Elizabeth. Her former attorney, Wood, maintained a law office in the Woolworth Building until his death in 1972 at age 96. His opposing trial counsel, McNamara, remained with the LIRR's legal department until his retirement in 1959, while McNamara's superior and counsel of record, Keany, continued as the railroad's general solicitor until he died in 1935. Justice Humphrey retired in 1936, a year after he gained notoriety for presiding over the marriage of heiress Doris Duke he died in 1940. [55] Andrews retired at the end of 1928, having reached the mandatory retirement age of 70 he died in 1936. [56] Cardozo was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1932 by President Herbert Hoover and served there until his death in 1938. [29]

After the Palsgraf case became prominent among lawyers, having been taught to many of them in law school, members of the family sometimes encountered startled reactions when lawyers learned their last name. Frank Palsgraf, Helen's grandson, told in 1978 of "being treated like a celebrity" by a prosecutor when called for jury duty, and causing the judge to reminisce about hard nights studying the case in law school. Nevertheless, the prosecutor struck him from the jury. [57] According to Posner, the later coverage of the family "makes it clear that, with the exception of Mrs. Palsgraf, the Palsgraf family was thrilled by its association with a famous case, notwithstanding the outcome". [58] In 1991, that association became closer, as Lisa Newell, first cousin four times removed of Judge Cardozo, married Palsgraf's great-grandson, J. Scott Garvey. [59]

Palsgraf came to the attention of the legal world quickly. William L. Prosser of the University of California Law School wrote that the Appellate Division's decision fell into the hands of Francis H. Bohlen of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Bohlen was at that time the reporter compiling the first Restatement of Torts for the American Law Institute (ALI), and Cardozo was informally one of the advisers. In that task, Bohlen was having difficulty dealing with the concept of duty of care in negligence, especially involving unforeseeable plaintiffs, and Prosser related that Cardozo was treated to a learned discussion by the other advisers of a case that might come before his court and, convinced by the arguments, used them to decide Palsgraf. [60] Kaufman doubted this story, which was told to Prosser by Dean Young B. Smith of Columbia, noting that the only meeting of the advisers between the two appeal decisions in Palsgraf took place in New York on December 12–13, 1927, beginning only three days after the Appellate Division ruled, and the notes reveal that Cardozo was absent the chief judge was hearing arguments all that week in Albany. Nevertheless, the discussions and materials from the Restatement compilation likely influenced Cardozo in his decision. [61]

Bohlen dwelt heavily upon Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf in presenting the Tentative Draft of the Restatement to the ALI's annual meeting, which approved the section citing Palsgraf with little discussion. [62] [b] Palsgraf quickly became well known in the legal community, and was cited in many cases, some of dubious relevance. According to Kaufman, "the bizarre facts, Cardozo's spin on the legal issue, the case's timing in relation to the Restatement project, its adaptability for law-school teaching, the policy-oriented dissent by Andrews, Cardozo's rhetoric, and Cardozo's name—all these factors combined to make Palsgraf a legal landmark." [59] According to Prosser, writing in his hornbook for law students, "what the Palsgraf case actually did was submit to the nation's most excellent state court a law professor's dream of an examination question". [63] But Professor (later Judge) John T. Noonan saw more than this, noting that Cardozo was then the nation's most prominent state-court judge: "The excitement of Palsgraf was not merely that it was a brilliant examination question it was an examination question answered by Cardozo." [63]

The first mentions of Palsgraf in law reviews were case notes written by law students, appearing over the course of the year following the decision by the Court of Appeals. Professor Robert L. Goodhart, in the Yale Law Journal in 1930, was at the front of an avalanche of commentary to such an extent that by 1938, Louisiana State University professor Thomas A. Cowan deemed Palsgraf "a legal institution". [64] The case entered the standard legal casebooks, from which law students learn, in the early 1930s, usually to illustrate the necessary connection between defendant's misconduct and plaintiff's injury in negligence cases. [65] According to Posner, writing in 1990, "Palsgraf is now the subject of a large scholarly literature, and is, I believe, the only case reprinted in all American casebooks on tort law." [66] Manz wrote, "everyone who has sat in an American law school torts class can recall the basic facts—the crowded railroad platform, the running men, the dropped package, the explosion, and the falling scale. Palsgraf has become a sort of legal 'urban legend'—an allegedly true, but improbable, tale told and retold to each new class of law students." [67] Professor W. Jonathan Cardi noted, "in law school classrooms, 'Palsgraf Day' is often celebrated with food and drink, dramatic reenactments, interpretive poems, and even mock duels between Judges Cardozo and Andrews". [68]

Palsgraf was soon adopted by some state courts, at times in different contexts: Though some state courts outside New York approved it, others did not, sometimes feeling that foreseeability was an issue for the jury to consider. [69] According to Posner, writing in 1990, Cardozo's holding that there is no liability to a plaintiff who could not have been foreseen "has been followed by a number of states besides New York, but it remains the minority rule. Most states continue to muddle along with the nebulous 'proximate cause' approach, which emphasizes the proximity in time and space of the defendant's careless act to the plaintiff's injury that was the approach taken by Judge Andrews's dissent in Palsgraf." [70]

The overwhelming majority of state courts accept that there must be a duty of care for there to be liability: the courts of Wisconsin, though, have stated that they have adopted Andrews' approach, and impose liability when there was a duty to any person, whether or not that person is the plaintiff. [71] The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) amended the earlier formulation only slightly, but the third Restatement (2009), takes an approach closer to that of Andrews in focusing on whether the defendant engaged in an activity that carried a risk of harm to another (not necessarily the plaintiff), and on whether the defendant exercised reasonable care. The new formulation makes foreseeability, or the scope of the risk, not a hurdle that must be overcome, as in Palsgraf, but a factor to be weighed with others when determining whether there was negligence. [72] [73] Thus, according to law professor David Owen in his 2009 article, "the Restatement (Third) discards Judge Cardozo's elemental work in Palsgraf so long ago. And . also rejects Judge Andrew's [sic] valuable insight that juries should be offered a wide range of fairness factors, beginning with foreseeability, in figuring how far responsibility should extend". [74]

According to Posner, "Cardozo's 'bottom line' is that there is no liability to an unforeseeable plaintiff". [70] Don Herzog, in his 2017 book, deemed the Palsgraf principle to mean that "if anyone was wronged here, it was the man with the parcel. The guards' wronging him happened to harm Mrs. Palsgraf. But that doesn't mean they wronged Mrs. Palsgraf. And if they didn't wrong her, she can't conceivably prevail in a tort action. Cardozo is not thinking that if he were on the jury, he wouldn't find the railroad liable. He is saying it was a legal error to let the jury finding stand." [75] This is because "the crucial fact for Cardozo is that the parcel of explosives was unmarked. So reasonably careful conductors worry only that if they make it fall, it will break . They have no reason to worry about the welfare of Mrs. Palsgraf." [76]

Cardozo has been praised for his style of writing in Palsgraf. Posner noted that in the facts of the case Cardozo "saw instantiated the basic principles of negligence law and was able to articulate them in prose of striking freshness, clarity, and vividness", in an opinion mostly written in short sentences and lacking footnotes or block quotes. [77] University of Pennsylvania Law School Professor Kim Lane Scheppele noted that the opinion was "written by Judge Benjamin Cardozo at the height of his formidable powers". [78] Richard Polenberg, in his study of that jurist, stated, "Cardozo had a genius for making it seem that the results he reached were logical, inevitable, and legally unassailable". [79] Prosser stated, "with due respect to the superlative style in which both [Cardozo's and Andrews' opinions] are written, neither of them wears well on long acquaintance. Both of them beg the question shamelessly, stating dogmatic propositions without reason or explanation." [80] Herzog was also less enthusiastic, noting that "the majority opinion is unfortunately written in the curious idiolect I sometimes call Cardozo-speak." [76]

From its early days, there has been criticism of Palsgraf, and more recently, of Cardozo for authoring it. Cowan, writing in 1938, described its holding as limited to its facts, that given the identical circumstances recurring, the railroad would breach no duty to the new plaintiff by assisting a man with such a package in boarding. [81] Prosser in his 1953 article wondered "how can any rule as to the 'scope of the risk' evolved from two guards, a package of fireworks and a scale aid in the slightest degree in the solution of this question? Is it proper, in Palsgraf itself, so utterly to ignore the fact that the plaintiff was a passenger[?] . until the question is decided, is Palsgraf really definite authority even for Palsgraf ?" [82]

Noonan's 1976 book chronicled the unwillingness by legal scholars to utilize the "multitude of legal facts not mentioned by Cardozo and Andrews", even though the lower-court record in Palsgraf was reproduced in a civil procedure casebook in the 1950s. [83] Noonan criticized Cardozo for not taking Palsgraf's circumstances into account when making his decision, and listed factors that may have influenced Cardozo against the plaintiff, including that he was a lifelong bachelor who did not have Palsgraf's experience of caring for children, and he may have frowned upon Wood's representation of Palsgraf (likely on a contingent fee, something not favored at the time). [84] Posner, writing in 1990, disagreed with Noonan and with feminist critics following him, noting that judges take an oath to do equal justice to rich and poor, "so the fact that Mrs. Palsgraf was poor would not have been a principled ground for bending the rules in her favor". [85] Noonan had considered unjust the award of court costs against Palsgraf, and in her 2016 book, law professor Cathleen Kaveny agreed, "the penalty imposed on Palsgraf for seeking justice through the courts was to deprive her, a single mother, of the ability to support her children . All judges, however can develop empathy. And in telling the story of Helen Palsgraf, Judge Noonan makes a good case for why they should." [86]

In 2011, Cardi analyzed the present-day influence that Palsgraf has had on state courts. He found that neither Cardozo nor Andrews has won on the question of how duty of care is formulated, with courts applying policy analyses. "As to the proper doctrinal home for plaintiff-foreseeability, Cardozo has undoubtedly prevailed. Although a clear majority of jurisdictions state that duty is the proper home for plaintiff-foreseeability, Cardozo's vision of foreseeability as a categorical determination has not been widely adopted." [87] But, he noted, "Andrews may have found a back door to victory. Arguably the most important consequence of the Palsgraf decision, the resolution of the judge/jury question, appears to lean in Andrews' direction. A majority of courts prefer to leave foreseeability—even as a part of duty—to the jury." [87]

Scheppele put Palsgraf in social context, noting that 108 passengers were killed in railroad operations on the LIRR in 1924, a typical figure for it in the 1920s.

Social scientists of a more qualitative and historical bent would see the Palsgraf case as part of a long history in which the railroad industry imposed substantial costs on the broader society, costs that were never added to the ledgers of the railroads. Most train accidents were not litigated. Those that were shared the fate of Mrs. Palsgraf's: each case was taken on its own facts as an isolated, freak occurrence, and the broader consequence, in which death and injury became a normal byproduct of running the railroad, was disregarded. If judges could see—if not through statistics, then perhaps through the social history of the railroad industry—just how dangerous trains were and how much death and destruction they left in their path, they may have been less inclined to think that Mrs. Palsgraf's problem was that those two men carried fireworks onto the platform that day. [88]


§ 1983 Civil Rights Claims Follow Local Rules on Statutes of Limitations

For § 1983 lawsuits, the courts will apply the statute of limitations applicable to similar actions in the subject locale. In other words, for personal injury and wrongful death claims in New Mexico, the SOL will follow the local New Mexico rules. Thus, the statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death will apply as these are the most similar in nature to § 1983 claims.

The confusion arises because § 1983 civil rights claims are almost invariably filed against governmental entities, such as prisons which is where Collins & Collins, P.C. focuses much of its work. So the question arises as to which New Mexico statute of limitations on personal injury and wrongful death claims should apply in case of § 1983 civil rights claims, the general personal injury SOL or the SOL for suits against the government?

Fortunately, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals which governs New Mexico federal district court has ruled alleviating the confusion.


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